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Anthony Chase, Law and History: The Evolution of the American Legal System 
(New York: The New Press, 1997). 
This is a very personal book, written with the grace and fervor that such efforts 
often summon from their authors. Anthony Chase, who teaches law at Nova 
Southeastern University, has brought to this book a wide range of reading but 
has chosen, as he admits freely, to follow the practice by which "Historians, 
without necessarily suppressing inconvenient facts, almost invariably treat 
their source material selectively and with a sense of proportion, however just 
or unjust. This book is no exception." (1) After invoking Sherlock Holmes (The 
Sign of the Four) in his opening epigram to explain his selectivity, Chase draws 
upon an impressive array of thinkers (and excludes an equal number) to 
produce what he unashamedly describes as "my outline of America legal 
history," a product on which his personal stamp is quite clear. 
Undergirding Chase's work is a point that few legal historians would argue 
with; namely, the "conviction that law has responded in important ways to the 
unfolding economic history of the nation." (164) Indeed, many of us would go 
so far as to agree in principle that in looking at legal change we find "an 
enormous amount of extremely artful obfuscatory talk about rights, justice, 
and precedent, specifically employed in behalf of judicial decisions which 
dramatically readjusted common law doctrine to fit new economic realities." 
(1 64) Beyond this point, however, many historians will shy away from further 
agreement. Chase follows his Holmesian quotation from The Sign of the Four 
with a multilayered quadripartite model for American legal history. The book 
locates four wars as pivotal: the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, World War 
11, and Vietnam, each of which ushered in a new era. Further, we find four 
chronological "periods that organize this rendition of legal history": the first 
stretching to the Civil War (though this period "can, itself, be broken down into 
four parts" [57]), the second to the New Deal, while the third proceeds through 
Vietnam, with a final period reaching the present. The transition to this fourth 
phase, we are informed, also presents us with four possible turning points. 
This Procrustean framework has provided the number four for other 
purposes as well. Thematically, the argument is based on "four 'topographic' 
or spatial models": "insideloutside," or the way that legal changes appear to 
lawyers as opposed to those outside the profession; "upldown," or the way 
legal institutions at the top reflect changes in an economic base; "lefthight," 
which he sees as "that between liberal (left) and authoritarian (right) forms of 
capitalism"; and "north/south," between the capitalist North and a slave regime 
South. (2-3) Were this not enough, Chase relies heavily on the conceptual 
model of Douglas Dowd, whose own US. Capitalist Development Since 1776 
(1993) provides four phases of capitalist development. Of the only "three 
serious, scholarly overviews of American legal history" worth noting, (7 1) 
pride of place is given not to Lawrence M. Friedrnan's highly acclaimed A 
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History ofAmerican Law (2d. ed., 1985), but to Grant Gilmore's interpretive 
Storrs lectures, The Ages ofAmerican Law (1977). And for good reason, as we 
follow the sign of the four: only Gilmore "emphasizes periodization over detail 
and focuses primarily on the outlines of legal history." (72) Gilmore provides 
only three "ages" of American law, but he did not write until the end of Chase's 
third period, and a fourth might be inferred. 
Periodization, then, drives this book. Although the division of historical 
development into more or less defined eras is often necessary and useful to 
comprehend the "broad-brush changes in law and society, over quite extended 
periods of time" (166) that Chase ambitiously engages, it comes with great 
perils. And this book reveals many of them. In the first place, the description 
of monolithic eras requires that vast generalizations lump together the messy 
details of human society into a coherence that did not exist. Some such 
generalizations work, but others do not; in providing one of the latter, Chase 
asserts, "Everyone understands the spirit of the law." (12) While such a 
statement may once have had scholarly adherents, poststructuralism has laid 
such a single-vision image to rest, and few scholars would attempt to ascribe a 
single perspective to any national population, especially that of the United 
States, and especially on a terrain as contested as that of the law. 
Moreover, emphasizing the sharpness of historical transitions tends to 
privilege the people who make and the events that mark those shifts. At the 
very least it privileges elite-controlled events and diminishes the role of the 
ordinary men and women who produce change - even legal change. Chase has 
no place in his analysis, for example, for the people who make up juries and 
nullify the powers that be, and thus he explains the O.J. Simpson outcome 
simply: "law is whatever lawyers and judges say it is." (16) Besides his glaring 
neglect of racism as a factor in American legal development (slavery is, of 
course, primarily an economic matter in this model), Chase completely 
neglects the role of the masses as agents of change. He agrees with "writers 
who maintain that Marxism has a continuing roll [sic] to play in social and 
economic debate" (36), but his Marxism is a crude one: Northern troops, he 
suggests, went willingly by the hundreds of thousands to slaughter in the Civil 
War to establish the hegemony of the corporation. Agreeing with Bamngton 
Moore, he tells us, any compromise that might have occurred to prevent the 
war could only have been imposed on Northern labourers and Western farmers, 
who would have submitted to a state capitalist order like that of Junker Prussia. 
Chase is proudly materialist, which perhaps explains the otherwise 
inexplicable neglect of Eugene Geneovese, whose blending of religion and 
Marxism in his history of slavery can not be quite so easily ignored. But a 
materialist perspective should not have omitted other influential figures, from 
the historical past as well as from the historiographical present. Had he given 
as much attention to Oliver Wendell Holmes - whose Social Darwinist 
materialism figured so prominently in the jurisprudence of a half century - as 
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to Sherlock Holmes, we would have a much filler understanding of the 
evolution of American law. 
Nevertheless, Chase's materialism quite properly attributes to changes in 
modes of production at the economic base of society the lurching changes in 
legal regimes that follow. Accepting, arguendo, the effective control of events 
by an (unidentified) elite, this model still requires that one must correctly 
identify the actual agents who instigate and solidify that revolutionary change. 
The type of changes one identifies necessarily dictate the type of change one 
wishes to prove. War, of course, serves this purpose, and Chase correctly 
shows how the cataclysms of war have swept aside old regimes and allowed 
new orders to emerge. But this produces two problems for Chase's analysis. In 
the first place, wars produce more than economic change. One might ask, 
therefore, why not choose the Korean War instead of Vietnam? Korea did, after 
all, usher in an era of fierce and repressive anticommunism that transformed 
American law and justified wholesale loss of civil liberties, just as it propelled 
the unquestioned ascendancy of corporate capitalism and the smashing of 
labour unionism. It also crystallized the race issue, marking the first time that 
African Americans fought alongside whites and inaugurating an era of struggle 
for racial justice. 
Secondly, the use of wars to periodize history only answers half the 
question he poses about "creative destruction": wars only clear the field and 
cannot alone do the necessary additional work of legitimizing a new order. 
Intellectuals must provide the rationalization, as Chase readily admits. But 
intellectuals do not develop their theories suddenly - and even if they do 
receive an inspired insight, their announcement of social theory rarely comes 
as a surprise and must find receptive soil in which to thrive. Chase nevertheless 
follows Procrustes once again and provides the actual place and time of the 
momentous transformative event that begins his story - in Glasgow on the 
morning of Friday, December 24, 1762, "to be exact" (25), when Adam Smith 
began his lectures on jurisprudence and is said to have founded philosophical 
materialism as a basis of legal thinking. 
Smith - along with Chase's interpretation - thus bears a heavy burden, 
that of launching the massive transfomiation toward philosophical materialism 
that led to Marx and all modem legal and political theory. This is a grjive error. 
Chase has chosen Smith because we identify him with the laissez-faire basis of 
Classical economics, which dominates the rest of the book But Smith (who, 
Chase notes, also divided history into four phases) was not delivering 
prescriptive lectures designed to convince the landed elite to foreswear 
mercantilism in favor of laissez-faire; rather, he was presenting a descriptive 
account of an economic order he had seen emerge and triumph over the course 
of many decades. Moreover, Classical economics and philosophical 
materialism are scarcely the same. Chase has omitted many giants of legal and 
economic thought from his survey of Western legal history, and not the least 
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among them is the man that Marx described as the real "father of us all" when 
talking about the origins of materialist political economy - Thomas Hobbes, 
another nonentity in Chase's book. 
Omitting Hobbes reveals another pitfall of errant periodizing: it requires 
the neglect of all who do not fit within that period and forces one to identify 
someone else who better fits the needs of the interpretative model. But Hobbes 
does not fit the timing or the content of the model, and he is consigned to 
oblivion. So, too, is the statist Alexander Hamilton, whose central role as 
political founder, jurisprudent, and economist makes his omission startling - 
but entirely understandable given the model imposed here. For Chase, the 
American Revolution and the war that produced it led to the destruction of 
mercantilism and the triumph of laissez-faire; Hamilton's state-sponsored 
development muddies the waters of this onrushing stream. 
This is, in short, a tendentious book, marred by its attempt to fit a complex 
story into a simple four-part disharmony. Chase uses the word "watershed," a 
term that historians - whether legal historians or economic historians - 
shun: to use a geological metaphor of this sort to establish a "Great Divide" 
(Chapter Three) denies even lingering continuity and does violence to the 
complexity and contingency of struggle. More of a long (219-page) and 
argumentative law-review article, Law and History has no index, and its 429 
consecutively numbered footnotes (through four chapters, of course) dominate 
many a page (see, especially, 1 1 1-1 14, where five and a half lines of text are 
followed by footnote 206 stretching across three pages, or those pages that 
contain two lines of text and two columns of forty-nine lines of footnotes). 
Chase explains that the long footnotes allow him to abridge his argument, 
although the practice has not prevented him from including in the text many 
needless digressions in his history of American law, such as his discussion of 
Japanese neofeudal antifascism or a long discourse on German strict liability 
law. The index was omitted, we are told, "to prevent people from looking 
through the index to find their name and only reading the paragraph or two 
where they are mentioned." (8) Were an index included, however, it would have 
cheered those omitted by revealing just how much other pertinent scholarship 
and alternative interpretation - not to mention obvious examples that 
contradict the model - were excluded, too. 
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